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The comparative constitutional politics of judicial review remain largely defined by
LPSRUWDQWZRUNVWKDWDUHQRZPRUHWKDQDGHFDGHROG7RP*LQVEXUJ¶V³LQVXUDQFH´WKHRU\1
DQG 5DQ +LUVFKO¶V ³KHJHPRQLF SUHVHUYDWLRQ´ WKHVLV2 both clarified the ways in which
politics shape the design and functionLQJRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRXUWV*LQVEXUJ¶VERRNVKRZHG
how the presence of political competition in Asia incentivized politicians to create and
PDLQWDLQ³LQGHSHQGHQW´MXGLFLDULHV+LUVFKOUHFRXQWHGFDVHVIURPVHYHUDOFRXQWULHVZKHUH
embattled political elites empowered courts to insulate their policy preferences. At a higher
level, the two books showed how the spread and strengthening of judicial review were
inextricably bound up with national politics.
The two books reviewed here, Daniel Brinks and Abby BlasV¶V The DNA of
Constitutional Justice in Latin America3 DQG 7KHXQLV 5RX[¶V The Politico-Legal
Dynamics of Judicial Review,4 help give us theoretical tools and empirical insights that
further push on the intertwinement between law and politics on high national courts. They
push towards fruitful new directions in research, particularly in fleshing out the causes and
FRQVHTXHQFHVRIGLIIHUHQW³UHJLPHV´RIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZ%RWKERRNVEXLOGRQFODVVLFZRUNV
in the field, while challenging core concepts.
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Brinks aQG%ODVV¶VDLPLVWRLOOXPLQDWHWKHGHVLJQRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRXUWVLQUHFHQW
Latin American history. They argue that high courts serve as a mechanism for
³FRQVWLWXWLRQDO JRYHUQDQFH´ ZLWK DQ RULJLQDWLQJ ³FRDOLWLRQ´ WKDW GHVLJQV D FRXUW WR EH
responsive to its goals over time.5 They propose a useful division of judicial design into
two parts: the scope of judicial authority, and mechanisms of judicial control and
accountability.6 7KHILUVWGLPHQVLRQGHDOVZLWKDFRXUW¶VDELOLW\WRLQWHUYHQHLQGLIIHUHQW
kinds of policy matters; the second with the ways in which political actors (or others) can
control a court with ex ante and ex post controls. The first dimension thus focuses on the
thickness of constitutional rights themselves, the ability of both elites and citizens to access
the courts in different ways, and the breadth of the effect of a judgment. The second is
about appointment mechanisms (which kinds of actors appoint judges, and in what
combination), the length and renewability of terms, and the ease and nature of removal.
Brinks and Blass create a set of measures for both dimensions and show that there
are some general regional trends over time. For example, most courts designed more
recently have a higher scope of authority than those designed in the past.7 This reflects the
LQIOXHQFH RI WKH ³QHZ FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´ LQ /DWLQ $PHULFD ZKLFK KDV OHG WR D JUHDWHU
amount of constitutional rights and more comfort with judicial enforcement of those
rights.8 But at the same time, they show that designs continue to show significant variance,
with the two dimensions of judicial power grouped into four different kinds of courts.
7KHUHDUH³VLGHOLQHGFRXUWV´ZLWKOLWWOHDXWKRULW\RUDXWRQRP\³SURFHGXUDODUELWHUV´WKDW
are fairly autonomous but can be accessed only on a narrow range of issues by elites,
³UHJLPHDOOLHV´WKDWODFNDXWRQRP\EXWKDYHDKLJKVFRSHRIDXWKRULW\DQGILQDOO\³PDMRU
SROLF\SOD\HUV´WKDWDUHVWURQJRQERWKGLPHQVLRQV 9
The authors conduct quantitative tests, as well as case studies, that support the idea
that each of these kinds of courts tend to be designed in different political contexts. The
causal variables sweep beyond the emphasis on political competition in the classic works
WR DOVR LQFOXGH PRUH LGHRORJLFDO IDFWRUV )RU H[DPSOH D ³SURFHGXUDO DUELWHU´ PLJKW EH
created when the political coalition creating a court is pluralistic but also seeks to restrict
access because it seeks an institution mainly to adjudicate disputes between elites (as in
0H[LFRLQ ³0DMRUSROLF\SOD\HUV´JHW formed where a pluralistic coalition includes
members, often on the left, who are ideologically committed to more aggressive judicial
enforcement of rights (as in Colombia in 1991). )LQDOO\ D ³UHJLPH DOO\´ FRXUW PD\ EH
expected when the originating coalition designing a court is dominated by a single political
force that expects to control appointments to the tribunal for the indefinite future; that force
might thus seek a tribunal with a high scope of authority, but low autonomy, so that the
tribunal will carry out a range of useful tasks for the regime (as in Venezuela in and after
1999). %ULQNVDQG%ODVV¶VFRQFHSWRIDUHJLPHDOO\GRYHWDLOVZHOOZLWKRWKHUZRUNVKRZLQJ
how modern authoritarian or competitive authoritarian regimes sometimes rely on courts
to carry out a range of tasks, and thus may imbue those courts with a great degree of

See BRINKS & BLASS, supra note 3, at 8±9.
See id. at 20±22.
See id. at 33.
See id. at 178.
See id. at 31.
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10. See David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy, 53 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1313 (2020).
11. See ROUX, supra note 4, at 51.
12. See id. at 144±45.
13. Id. at 257.
14. See id. at 312.
15. See id. at 312±13.
16. See BRINKS & BLASS, supra note 3, at 20±21 (noting that existing theories of judicial independence ³deny

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 40 Side A

authority even as they use ex ante and ex post mechanisms to tether the court tightly to
regime preferences. As Dixon and I have recently argued, a political actor seeking to take
over a court, but to use it for core regime tasks such as repressing opposition politicians or
consolidating political power, may attack appointment mechanisms but leave the formal
powers of a court intact or even expand them. 10
7KHXQLV5RX[¶VVtudy of the political-legal dynamics of judicial review aims at the
question of how judges and legal elites justify and talk about judicial review. He argues
that there are different ways in which constitutional orders relate law and politics. Drawing
off RIFODVVLFVRFLRORJLFDOWKHRU\E\1RQHWDQG6HO]QLFNKHFRQWUDVWV³OHJDOLVWLF´UHJLPHV
RIMXGLFLDOUHYLHZWKDWFOHDUO\VHSDUDWHODZDQGSROLWLFVIURP³LQVWUXPHQWDO´UHJLPHVWKDW
see law and politics as unavoidably intertwined. 11 From this, and the question of whether
a regime is authoritarian or democratic, he draws a four-part typology of judicial review
regimes, which he examines primarily by doing three detailed case studies of Australia
(democratic legalism), India (democratic instrumentalism), and Zimbabwe (authoritarian
legalism, with an interlude of instrumentalism). He then examines the landscape of judicial
review in ten other countries, as a check on the initial conclusions.
Roux is interested in the question of how regimes change²he argues that they are
related to, but distinct from, both ordinary politics and formal constitutional replacement.
Instead, they reflect a set of attitudes about constitutional law that are relatively durable,
tend to revert to type, and are generally only changed through a significant exogenous
VKRFN $WWHPSWHG VKLIWV ZLWKRXW VXFK D VKRFN VXFK DV WKH 0DVRQ &RXUW¶V FKDOOHQJH WR
legalism in Australia in the 1990s, will likely fail or be absorbed by the dominant legal
culture.12 Roux also finds that some kinds of regimes appear to be rare. For example, he
finds few examples of democratic legalism outside of India and the United States, he
DUJXHV EHFDXVH ³>V@LWXDWLRQV LQ ZKLFK MXGLFLDO GHFLVLRQ-making in a democracy is both
clearly ideologically motivated and politically tolerated depend on an unusual combination
RIIDFWRUV´13
Roux also draws out some of the normative implications of his theory, suggesting
that different regimes of judicial review raise different questions and have different
weaknesses. Democratic legalism, for example, depends on the suspension of disbelief on
the point that law can be separated from politics and may make a constitutional regime
more rigid.14 Instrumentalism, however, may make the courts and constitution a partisan
battleground (as Roux argues happened in the US) or a locus of complaints about
democratic dysfunction (as he argued happened in India).15
Both books push beyond existing work in interesting ways. Brinks and Blass, for
example, problematize the foundational concept of judicial independence. As they note,
all courts are dependent in some sense on the support of certain groups. 16 What really
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th[e] essential fact´ that courts are ³political institutions´).
17. See ROUX, supra note 4, at 85±89.
18. See MICHAELA HAILBRONNER, TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RISE OF GERMAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 97 (2015).
19. See David Landau, The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence: A New Approach to
Modeling Judicial Behavior in Latin America, 37 GEO. WASH. INT¶L L. REV. 687 (2005).
20. See DAVID LANDAU, A FUSION OF THE POLITICAL AND THE LEGAL: JUSTICE CEPEDA¶S INSTITUTION
BUILDING OF THE COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, IN TOWERING JUSTICES (Iddo Porat & Rehan
Abeyratne eds., forthcoming 2020).
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varies, then, are the identities of the actors in this group, and tracking these differences can
tell us a lot about how a court is likely to behave. ,Q³UHJLPHDOO\´FRXUWVWKRVHRQWKH
court will usually be dependent on the regime itself; in other kinds of courts, the political
coalitions to which courts are accountable may be more complex or even include other
actors such as judges, but there are still mechanisms of accountability. Often, then, asking
how independent a court is will be less useful than asking to which actors its judges tend
to be accountable. 5RX[¶VZRUNLQWXUQLVDYDOLDQWDWWHPSWWREULQJLGHDWLRQDOFRQFHSWV
about law into judicial politics. Without question, as he argues, these conceptions matter
greatly in the way judges, political elites, and citizens look at and use law, and they have
very rarely been integrated into political theories of judicial review. 17
While the broad typologies developed by both books are useful, both also suggest
new questions and invitations to further²and perhaps even finer-grained²work. Roux
may be right that broad shifts between legalism and instrumentalism are rare, but his own
book points out many examples of shifts between subtypes of legalism and
instrumentalism that are quite rich. Take Germany as an example. The dominant modern
constitutional culture has retained an emphasis on formalism from its historical roots, in
0LFKDHOD+DLOEURQQHU¶VWHOOLQJEXWKDVVKLIWHGWRZDUGVZKDWVKHFDOOV³YDOXHIRUPDOLVP´
a more substantive conception of formalism emphasizing the weighing of constitutional
values.18 Something similar happened in Colombia when the new constitution and
Constitutional Court were created in 1991: an older constitutional culture with a procedural
YDULDQWRIIRUPDOLVPJDYHZD\WRVXEVWDQWLYH³YDOXHIRUPDOLVP´WKDWKDVDOORZHGIRUWKH
emergence of one of the strongest and most creative high courts in the world. 19 Roux is
right to point to an element of continuity between these shifts, but they are nonetheless
consequential.
A related point is that countries often have internal heterogeneity in their regimes of
judicial review. Different judges, or legal elites, may have very different conceptions of
what judicial review means. Take Colombia again as an example. The dominant legal
FXOWXUH KDV EHHQ ³YDOXH IRUPDOLVW´ %XW VRPH RI WKH PRVW LQIOXHQWLDO MXGJHV RQ WKH
Colombian Constitutional Court have carried a more instrumental vision of law. Justice
Manuel Jose Cepeda Espinosa, for example, who was educated in the United States, helped
design the Constitutional Court as a young legal adviser, and later served as one of its most
LQIOXHQWLDOMXGJHVLVDGHYRWHHRI1RQHWDQG6HO]QLFN¶VFRQFHSWLRQ of responsive law. I
have argued that he was influential in part because he was D³MXULVSUXGHQWLDORXWVLGHU´²a
savvy instrumentalist in a formalist world. 20
Similarly, there may be heterogeneity between elite and popular conceptions of
constitutional law. Roux categorizes the United States as a paradigmatic case of legal
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21. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States,
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G.
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court) (³Judges are like umpires. Umpires
don¶t make the rules, they apply them.´).
22. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS 128 (2008).
23. See BRINKS & BLASS, supra note 3, at 42.
24. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 22, at 87±91.
25. David E. Landau, Beyond Judicial Independence: The Construction of Judicial Power in Colombia 88
(Oct.
2014)
(unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation,
Harvard
University)
(available
at
https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/14226088).
26. See id. at 87±88.
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instrumentalism. I am more skeptical. There are certainly significant elements of
instrumentalism among US lawyers. But these views are by no means uncontested and
seemingly formalist methods of constitutional interpretation like originalism in fact are
increasingly strong. Regardless of views at the elite level, at any rate, popular views of
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOODZLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDUHSUREDEO\EHVWHQFDSVXODWHGE\-XVWLFH5REHUW¶V
analogy at his confirmation hearings that judges are mere umpires who do not get to make
the rules.21
The typology between four types of courts constructed by Brinks and Blass seems
to explain a good chunk of the logic of the design of high courts in Latin America. The
obvious extension of the project is into questions that show the ways in which
constitutional design interacts with the performance of the court over time, and the ways
in which models can change. For the most part the authors²quite sensibly²leave these
questions aside in their own project.
One way judicial design can change over time is through formal amendment. Take
Mexico, where the Supreme Court was either a sidelined court or weak regime ally until
1994, when it was transformed into a procedural arbiter mainly tasked with adjudicating
political disputes in the new multiparty political system. 22 The rules were changed again
in 2011, when the individual complaint or amparo was strengthened and an incorporation
clause was added requiring construction of constitutional rights in light of human rights
treaties.23 This has likely made the Mexican Court into a major policy player, as shown
by recent rulings on a range of topics including same-sex marriage and decriminalizing
drug possession.
Courts themselves, once created, may also become participants in judicial design.
The individual complaint mechanisms found in Latin America offer a good example.
Constitutional and statutory texts on these mechanisms themselves vary widely within
Latin America.24 But judicial construction is also important in many countries. The
Colombian tutela is a striking example. The text itself designs a powerful and simple
instrument²decisions must be made within ten days at each level, and expressly do not
need the assistance of a lawyer.25 But the Court itself has settled textual ambiguities and
created doctrine in ways that have massively increased its power. For example, the Court
held that the tutela could be used to enforce socioeconomic rights as well as civil and
political rights, review ordinary judicial decisions, and issue structural, as opposed to
merely individual, remedies.26 None of these points was clear in the text. One way of
looking at what the Court did is that it was fleshing out the spirit of the constitutional
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project; a more radical take is that it seized the ability to create its own power.
In short, the books by Roux and Brinks and Blass do a great service to the field²
WKH\ EXLOG RII RI EXW PRYH EH\RQG WKH WUDGLWLRQDO OLWHUDWXUH¶V IRFXV %RWK DOVR SRLQW
towards further questions, and complexities, that should preoccupy further work in the
field, at the intersection of law and legal culture, as well as that between design,
constitutional change, and judicial behavior.
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